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By Martin Savransky
As someone who thinks and works on the edges of the social sciences I
am always curious about—and fascinated by—the ways in which ideas,
feelings, propositions, demands, and attachments of various kinds have
dynamically contributed and continue to contribute to articulating both the
knowledge-practices of social scientific disciplines and the habits or ethical
sensibilities that inform those forms of inquiry as well as their dreams,
hopes, and fears. This is not to rehearse again the old dictum that it is
merely ideas that make the world go round. Oftentimes, if not always,
ideas emerge from unexpected, material encounters that force one to think
something (a)new. But it seems nevertheless true, at least to me, that
while the world is not made solely of ideas, it does partake in what, after
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1967), we might refer to as its own
adventure of ideas.
The idea of ‘relevance’ has recently become almost ubiquitous in the
ways in which the knowledge-practices of the social sciences are
articulated, justified, funded, judged, criticised, and experienced. That the
practices of such sciences must ‘be’ or ‘become’ relevant seems to
have become a demand that is extremely hard to resist. And who would
want to resist it? Who would want to suggest that the activity to which one
dedicates one’s best efforts is irrelevant or that its relevance should not be
a matter of concern? Yet, at the same time, there is often a sceptical tone
that lies at the center of the various demands for relevance. One that, by
posing the very question ‘how is this relevant?’, suspects that in fact the
practices of the social sciences might, and likely do, fall short of convincing
responses. Indeed, demands for relevance have materialised in a myriad
of forms: in rather ‘apocalyptic’ texts about ‘the end’ of the social
sciences and of universities more generally; in calls for ‘public
engagement’, ‘impact’, ‘interdisciplinarity’, ‘self-auditing’, and
‘scientific accountability’; in public and policy debates around how
funding should be allocated; in purportedly ‘emancipatory’ calls emerging
within the social sciences that demand that ‘wider public issues’ be
addressed; and many more.
Fuelling the recent sense that, yet again, the future of the social sciences
is far from guaranteed, such a series of demands has become so widely
disseminated and pressing, so much a part of daily scientific activities, that
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it has failed to give rise to more profound reflections as to what
‘relevance’ might mean. As soon as the question ‘what does it mean for
something to be relevant?’ is posed, however, all those multiple demands
begin to appear under a different light. On the one hand, demands for
relevance emerge in the context of a proposed reformation of the
institutional and intellectual organisation of scientific activity that might
foster more interdisciplinarity and greater accountability for scientific and
technological innovation by becoming ‘embedded’ throughout research
and development programmes, thereby better contributing to and
informing policy and innovation (e.g. Felt 2014, Levidow & Neubauer
2014, Gibbons et al. 1994, Mayer et al. 2013, Nowotny et al. 2001,
Rappert 1999). Thus, the 2013 Vinilus Declaration on the 2020 Horizons
of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Europe states:
Making use of the wide range of knowledge, capabilities, skills and
experiences readily available in SSH [Social Sciences and
Humanities] will enable innovation to become embedded in society
and is necessary to realise the policy aims predefined in the
‘Societal Challenges’. (Vinilus Declaration 2013)
On the other hand, calls for a more relevant social science emerge from a
number of heterogeneous positions that see the latter as already
complicit in forms of neoliberal governance and hence detached from
wider moral and political public concerns (e.g. Burawoy, 2005, Evans
2005). In any case, questions about the extent to which the contemporary
social sciences are ‘relevant’ are pervasive in the field.
Despite the aforementioned demands, it is somewhat puzzling that almost
none of them emerges from any in-depth exploration of what ‘relevance’
entails, what place it occupies in the worlds that the social sciences
encounter, which modes of inquiry it might require, and what kinds of
habits of thought and feeling its understanding might help cultivate.
‘Relevance’ has become so ubiquitous and multifarious a demand, it has
become such a ‘tyranny’—as political scientist Matthew Flinders (2013)
has recently put it—that it has failed to raise any substantial, theoretical
reflection on what it itself might involve. Enforced by some and dismissed
by others, the notion of ‘relevance’ has become something of an empty
placeholder that heralds an ideal solution to general, anonymous, and
pre-existing problems. A solution whose conditions of success are said to
be definable in advance, thus turning ‘relevance’ into an abstract criterion
of demarcation (Fraser 2009).
That this be the case, however, is no reason to dismiss the concept. Quite
to the contrary, in my view, it is an opportunity to wonder about what
‘relevance’ might come to entail while, at the same time, attempting to
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produce a response that may allow us to resist the tyranny that often
becomes associated with its demands and to speculate about what a
social science that would take the question of relevance seriously could
look like. The task, then, is to take relevance seriously while not
immediately complying with what the demands that are posed in its name
seem to assume about it.
Indeed, the idea that ‘relevance’ constitutes a solution to a pre-existing
problem (whatever the problem might be) is common to most if not all of
these demands as well as to some theories that use the concept in the
information sciences. Relevance appears as a value that is added to the
knowledges produced by the social sciences and whose conditions of
success depend upon a process of recognition performed by a public.
Interestingly, such a characterisation finds some support in one of the very
few theories of relevance produced within the social sciences—namely,
Alfred Schutz’s (1970) phenomenological theory, which proposes that
relevance be conceived as the process whereby an individual
consciousness encounters an unfamiliar object within an otherwise familiar
surrounding and deploys efforts to interpret it. According to Schutz, this act
of interpretation, combined with the subject’s own motivations, will
transform the subject’s phenomenal field and future behaviour. Now,
while there might be some psychological value in such an account, to
reduce the question of relevance to a theory of subjective responses is, to
my mind, deeply problematic.
Such an assumption forgets something crucial—namely, that the very
emergence of a ‘response’ depends upon a situation posing a perplexing
question. In other words, we cannot solve the perplexity induced by the
problem of how things become relevant by saying that there is a subject
recognising them as such. For the very experience of worth that allows
something to be characterised as relevant involves a sense that there is
value beyond ourselves, that something that is not ourselves matters.
Thus, to include in our interrogation of the concept of relevance the
perplexing questions that may elicit responses of diverse kinds is to cease
thinking of relevance as a subjective appreciation of an otherwise
irrelevant problem, and to restore to it its character as an event that
belongs to the world. In other words, I want to entertain the proposition
that relevance is not a value that the social sciences, or their publics,
‘add’ to the knowledges the former produce, but that it already inheres,
as an event and as a problem to be developed, in the situations into which
they inquire. In order to entertain this second understanding of relevance I
propose we begin from a simpler and more self-evident expression, one
that may allow us to turn the ‘tyranny’ that is often associated with the
concept of relevance into a productive constraint upon social inquiry. This
is the expression that things matter.
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Things matter
This is at once an obvious and potentially powerful proposition. However, it
is also one that our habits of thought, which have taught us to distrust our
direct experiences, make surprisingly difficult to grasp. We should
therefore tread carefully. In this sense, the riddling character of the verb
‘to matter’ might prove instructive. To say that things matter contains a
double proposition, just like the verb ‘to matter’ conveys two senses. The
key is to conjoin the two senses and propositions into one. On one pole,
things matters as they materialise—they come into and remain temporarily
in existence, they acquire a certain stubbornness. On the other, and at the
same time and by the very same process, they matter as they become
relevant to some degree and in some manner. The point is that there is
not one sense of mattering without the other. Indeed, to the extent that
something comes into existence, its coming in(to) matter is always specific
and situated, and it is that situated specificity which makes the thing what
it is—even if only momentarily—and which makes it matter. Minimally, then,
everything that has a determinate existence (this human, this table, this
keyboard, this idea, this feeling) has some relevance by virtue of being
what it is—it matters that this thing is what it is, and that it is not something
else. Indeed, as philosopher Tristan Garcia (2014) has recently argued,
only a generic, indeterminate ‘anything’ is what does not matter—anything
is ‘no-matter-what’. Namely, it does not matter what it is.
In other words, facts exist to the extent that they come (in)to matter in
specific situations, and they matter insofar as they come into existence. In
this way, relevance might be said to belong to what Whitehead (1968)
described as the primary experience—it should be noted, not necessarily a
‘psychological’, ‘subjective’ or even ‘human’ experience—of the actual
world. Namely, a value experience whose expression is none other than
‘Have a care, here is something that matters’ (1968: 116). As he argues
(1968: 111):
Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value intensity.
Also no unit can separate itself from the others, and from the
whole. And yet each unit exists in its own right. It upholds a value
intensity for itself, and this involves sharing value intensity with the
universe. Everything that exists has two sides, namely, its
individual self and its signification in the universe.
In this way, something comes (in)to matter for itself, for other things with
which it composes a situation, and for the world of things to which it
becomes added. It is to this event of a coming (in)to matter, and to the
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problem it poses to those with whom it is concerned, that I want to
associate the question of relevance.
Important implications follow from the seemingly obvious suggestion that
things matter. The first implication is that the relevance of things is not
something that is added to them by reason of a subjective process of
recognition of worth. In contrast, relevance belongs to the world—it inheres
in the nature of things. Second, if everything that exists matters in some
degree and in some manner, then, conversely, everything that matters has
some mode and degree of existence, even if this mode is not entirely
‘material’ or physical. This means that we should not confuse this
proposition with what in recent years we have come to refer to as the
‘new materialisms‘. Not because they’re ‘wrong’, but because, in this
context, such a name might be misleading—matter matters, most certainly,
but so does everything that exists, somewhere, in some way or another;
ideas matter, ghosts matter, words matter, feelings matter.
Third, because the coming (in)to matter of things is always situated and
specific, ‘there is no such thing a bare value’ (Whitehead 1926: 90); that
is, there are no pure, general, universal, values. Values too are only
specific, arising within the many situations in and for which things matter in
different degrees and manners. In this way, the idea of relevance cannot
become a general criterion that could demarcate what matters from what
doesn’t, but needs to be approached as a question for wondering about
how, to what degree, and in what manner, things come (in)to matter within
specific situations.
To suggest that things matter is, then, to resist the longstanding bifurcation
between fact and value, a side of a many-headed monster that Whitehead
(2004) famously named ‘the bifurcation of nature‘. As is well known, the
bifurcation of nature consists in separating the world into two realms of
reality. As Whitehead (2004: 30) phrases it, one side of this bifurcation
would be ‘the nature apprehended in awareness’. The other, ‘the nature
which is the cause of awareness’:
The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds
within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the
warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of the
velvet. The nature which is the cause of awareness is the
conjectured system of molecules and electrons which so affects
the mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature.
We can see such a bifurcation at work in many demands for relevance: on
the one hand there are the “true” and “objective”, bare facts that science
discovers; on the other, there is the relevance of those facts from the
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public’s point of view. That contemporary demands for relevance place
truth and objectivity on the first side of reality is, to be sure, no surprise.
Since the inauguration of modern science, the bifurcation of nature has
been key to define the ‘value-neutrality’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘truth’ of
scientific knowledge.
To suggest that facts matter, then, is a way of resisting this bifurcation. It is
however certainly neither the first nor the only form of resistance; it is
probably not the last one either. Another prominent attempt at resisting the
distinction between fact and value is, for example, Bruno Latour’s call to
move from the anonymous and supposedly pure ‘matters of fact‘ of
modern epistemology, to always controversial and hybrid ‘matters of
concern’ or ‘things’, as he calls them after Heidegger. Latour’s (2004a:
246. emphasis in original) call was an attempt to simultaneously draw
social scientists’ attention to the liveliness of objects and to draw
scientists’ attention to their sociality, thereby simultaneously multiplying
and distributing the many heterogeneous agencies that labour towards the
making of things:
what is presented here is […] a multifarious inquiry launched with
the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history,
sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing
to make it exist and to maintain its existence.
While I am appreciative of Latour’s project and of his notion of “matters of
concern” as a way of anchoring a different kind of social study of science,
his project differs considerably from mine and, consequently, so does his
way of resisting the modern distinction between facts and values.
Indeed, by inquiring into the question of relevance in contemporary social
science, I am not calling anthropologists, philosophers, metaphysicians,
historians, sociologists, political scientists, or psychologists to delve in to
the making of ‘things’. Things matter not just because many other things
converge in their making, but quite simply because their coming into
existence makes a difference to the worlds they help compose—they come
into matter, and they matter to them. Thus, what concerns me is the
exploration of what might be required—intellectually, ethically, and
politically—for social scientific practices to take up ‘relevance’ as a
question of the situated patterns that organise and relate humans,
other-than-humans, ideas, feelings, and so on in ways that matter for
those with which a problematic situation might be concerned. What I am
interested in is not so much a different job description for social inquiry, but
the possibility of a different ethos of social inquiry that would seek to
negotiate the question ‘how is it, here, that things matter?’, without
imposing on the ‘thing’ either a specific nature or a number in advance,
page 6 / 10
Science, Medicine, and Anthropology
http://somatosphere.net
and without singlehandedly delimiting the horizon that defines where
‘here’ ends.
As a taster of what is a much longer project, I will just say that the key to
this question is that any possible answer be negotiated in practice.
Whenever a social scientist encounters a problematic situation as an
object of inquiry, it is not simply her practice that makes that situation
‘matter’. Rather, the situation is already constituted by an ecology of
dynamic and fragile patterns of relevance, heterogeneous objects and
relations, to which her questions, her assumptions, theories, and methods,
in sum, her mode of knowledge-production become added. Such an
addition, to be sure, is never innocent, that is, it has effects—it affects the
ecology of such patterns in different ways. Thus, the point is that
‘negotiation‘ means neither that it is her questions or methods
themselves that, as it were, produce that ecology out of thin air, nor that
her goal is that of discovering the relevant way of defining the problem that
characterises the situation as if such a way could be said to fully preexist
the questions themselves. By contrasts, problems are always a matter of
‘invention’—a notion that, in my reading, conjoins discovery and creativity.
Isabelle Stengers (1997: 6) expresses the nature of a negotiation of
relevance with notable clarity in the case of experimental sciences when
she argues:
What is noteworthy about ‘relevance’ is that it designates a
relational problem. One speaks of a relevant question when it
stops thought from turning in circles and concentrates the attention
on the singularity of an object or situation. Although relevance is
central to the effective practices of the experimental sciences, in
their public version it often boils down to objective truth or arbitrary
decision: to objective truth when the question is justified by the
object in itself, and to arbitrary decision when it refers to the use of
an instrument or experimental apparatus whose choice is not
otherwise commented on. In the first case, the response appears
to be “dictated” by reality. In the second, it appears to be imposed
by the all-powerful categories of which the investigative instrument
is bearer. Relevance designates, on the contrary, a subject that is
neither absent nor all-powerful.
Thus, the question of relevance is one which affects the modes by which
social scientific practices interrogate and negotiate how things come (in)to
matter—it is a question that makes social scientific inquiry into a risky
process. In this way, relevance should be understood as a problem that
affects the very situated exchanges that make every answer dependent
upon the question that calls for it, and every solution to a problem
dependent on, or deserving of, the manner in which the problem is defined
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(Deleuze 1994). For every definition of a problem guiding inquiry and
every question that may point to an unknown that a scientific practice of
knowledge-making may seek to address also produces a pattern of
contrasts that productively constrains the range of possible answers that
might matter to it.
Nothing guarantees, however, that the pattern of contrasts will address the
object in a manner that matters to it, her, or him. If relevance is to become
capable of affecting the manner of directing practical inquiries in the social
sciences, of feathering the arrow of questions in a way that matters for
those to whom the questions are posed, then the term cannot designate, 
ex post, or worse, ex ante, the effect that a knowledge-product has in
relation to the public to which it may be communicated. Relevance needs
to be thought as an active constraint upon practice—a constraint that forces
social scientists to put the pattern of contrast that a question generates,
that is, the assumptions that underpin it, at risk.
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Note
This is a slightly revised version of a talk delivered in Barcelona in July
2014, organised by the STS-b group at the Open University of Catalonia (I
especially want to thank Daniel López, Israel Rodríguez-Giralt, Tomás
Sánchez Criado and Manuel Tironi for their responses to the paper). The
text has been mostly left as originally presented, and therefore reflects an
oral style of presentation, with no ambition of peer-reviewed accuracy. As
such, it constitutes no more than a snippet of a book-length research on
page 8 / 10
Science, Medicine, and Anthropology
http://somatosphere.net
the development of a new ethics of inquiry for the contemporary social
sciences oriented by the question of relevance.
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